

# *Critique*

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*Editorial*

S. C. DENNIS

“*Structure!*”- reads the inevitable comment in red pen next to some under or over-embellished section of your latest formative essay. Never (or almost never)- “*Content!*”. Sometimes it feels as if you could write anything at all and still hit the grade, providing your structure is exemplary. Philosophy is fond of, even obsessed with, making distinctions; and the metaphysical structure/content distinction is one I feel ought to be challenged, even if only to vindicate its ubiquity, though my hunch is that structure is more fundamental than is sometimes suspected.

The first thing to note is that structure is a genuine and pervasive feature of the world. This is not to say that the world forms a single system, though that may be the case in some sense; but it is to say that the world is constituted by individuable, structured entities and integrated systems. We, as human beings, are structured entities composed of a plethora of small, targeted systems which enable us to perform a stunning range of tasks. If structure is indeed pervasive, then it would be well worth philosophy’s having an account of it. How, then, can we characterise ‘structure’? It may be the case that no single definition can be given, either without recourse to particular structural notions like ‘whole-part’, or due to some metaphysical manifestation of the paradox of analysis. Peter Simons offers a starting point, however, when he writes that ‘structure’ is:

“The *manner* in which something is constructed or the *way* its parts are related [...] ‘structure’ refers to the object which *has* structure [...] An organised body or combination or mutually connected and dependent parts and elements” (Simons, 1987: 354)

This would suggest that structure is a *mode* of being, somehow derivative from the more fundamental content (in a broad ontological sense) it modifies. It further suggests that structure is a *combinatorial* matter, plus *some set of relevant dependence relations*.

The former, but not the latter half of this characterisation is consistent with *mereological nihilism* (MN) as defended by Cian Dorr (2005) and in a recent change of heart by Ted Sider (2010) from his earlier (2007). MN states that nothing is a proper part of anything; there are no wholes in the sense of entities with complex mereological constitution. Trees, rocks and human beings are not fully fledged existents, but are abstracts of common sense. All that really exists is simple subatomic particles. For any localised particles  $a$ ,  $b$  and  $c$  there can be no *additional* entity  $abc$ , only a non-additional set  $\{a, b, c\}$ .

With MN offering something which common conception may balk at, but particle physics may well endorse, the question then is how do we account for the systematising relations (for they will be relations of some sort) which lead us to group and prioritise some sets of simples over others? C. I. Lewis offers a distinction which may point us in the right direction: *systems are determined, not constituted* (1923: 144). Lewis takes this idea to imply that possible worlds are themselves systems of a kind- of mutually consistent propositions or situations. But whether our own world is itself a system, that is a single unified structure determined by its constituents, is something of a moot point. Simons in his (2003: 249) writes that “it is clearly no part of the metaphysician's task to discover whether the universe is a system of a particular sort, or several systems, or none. That is the job of the empirical scientists to discover and explore.” On the other hand, Jonathan Schaffer takes the apparent failure of (David) Lewisian Recombination<sup>1</sup> (LR) in tandem with the notion of quantum entanglement to imply that “the cosmos is one vast entangled system” (2010: 50-55). What I think is clear, in any case, is that structural questions can make a huge difference when it comes to assessing the number and nature of our ontological commitments.

I am with Lewis when he writes of “the issues of monism and pluralism” that “as they are usually stated, the truth lies somewhere between them” (Lewis, 1923: 150). I am

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<sup>1</sup> There are different ways of cashing out LR, either in terms of property distribution or in terms of aggregate totalities across possible worlds.

not an outright supporter of MN, plausible though it may be, and this is precisely because I believe that only a mereology which incorporates appropriate dependence and structural relations can yield ontological answers which match Lewis' intuition here, thus barring the paths to set-theoretic pluralism and "Bobjectivist" monism (cf. Horgan and Potrč, 2000). The trick is to individuate entities, properties or states of affairs according to their dependence relations, without making one's metaphysical strictures too strong or too weak, such that common sense is not overly violated. For instance, we human beings are independent and unique entities in a very relevant and real sense, yet this does not entail that we are self-sufficient in terms of origin, nutrition or continuation.

This is where I think structure emerges not as a by-product of the mere arrangement of 'content', but as the sole determiner of the most fundamental metaphysical and logical properties, viz. identity, individuation, unity and existence. John Hawthorn has explored a view he calls '*causal structuralism*', whereby the necessary and sufficient conditions of a property are exhausted by consideration of the causal relations into which it can enter (Hawthorn, 2006: 212). I think this is a promising start for anyone seeking a middle ground between standard conceptions of monism and pluralism. It is thus interesting to note that Hawthorn considers it possible that "Structural Combinatorialism" could supplant and even exceed LR in modal contexts (*ibid*: 221). Such a strategy prioritises structural *dispositions* and compossible *systems* over the creation of unstructured sets or lists of Quinean bound variables in order to derive a *structured* ontology that neither suffers from a collapse into monism or an explosion of arbitrarily postulated property-clusters across possible worlds.

Hawthorn further considers another position he calls "Hyperstructuralism", whereby structure is all and everything (*ibid*: 223). He dismisses this, writing "I take it none of us are hyperstructuralists", though he adds that in answer to the challenges it faces "it is not clear that the causal structuralist is devoid of an answer" (*ibid.*). I for one remain intrigued as to whether a wholly structural ontological picture could be presented. I do not think that it is entirely implausible, because I cannot shake the feeling that the notion of 'content' is so dependent on structural relations as to be dispensable as an

independent concept. Nor is the idea alien to modern physics. With the rise of quantum computation and research into notions of quantum *information*, some now take the role of physics to be “to discover the ways that nature allows, and prevents, *information* to be expressed and manipulated, rather than particles to move” (Steane, 1998: 119). To my mind, this certainly expresses a structurally based programme of research into the nature and modality of determined systems, rather than a mere taxonomy of existents. There is much to consider in this area of metaphysics, and I look forward to exploring some of these issues next year.

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**Philosophy Among the Sciences and Humanities:**

**A defence of the philosophical classics**

ANDY HAMILTON

In any artform, the classics are living things that one returns to for refreshment and inspiration. This is true in philosophy too, I will argue. Philosophy shares something of the progressive character of the sciences, but has an affinity with the arts and humanities in finding a place for the classics. This view is denied by the scientific paradigm now dominant in Anglo-American philosophy, that conceives of the discipline as progressing in step with advances in the natural sciences. Scientism assimilates the methods of philosophy to those of the natural sciences, and thus rejects the notion of a philosophical classic, and of philosophy as a living tradition. There are no scientific classics in the relevant sense, and no living literary tradition.

The effects of scientific discovery are enduring, but scientific advances rapidly make particular works redundant. Classics in the sense of Darwin's *The Origin of Species* or Galileo's *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* are therefore anomalous in the history of science, and do not perform the same role as artistic or philosophical classics do in their own domain. Only in their own time were Darwin's and Galileo's works read to gain understanding of evolution or cosmology; today scholars read them to gain understanding of their historical contribution to these disciplines. For a scientific work, Darwin's *The Origin of Species* is in any case quite untypical, being readable, devoid of references and bibliography, and intended as a popular preview of a larger work. More typical are the largely unread writings of Copernicus, or Newton's *Principia Mathematica*, which even Locke, who was profoundly influenced by Newton's ideas, did not read. Scientific works are not comparable to classic literary or philosophical texts.

What is a classic? There is a continuum of cases, from "classical" as used to describe dead languages such as Ancient Greek and Latin, and to connote classicism, in particular the Renaissance revival of Greek and Roman art and thought, and the



academic tradition of the classical, to "classic" as implying a living presence in contemporary culture. The tuxedo is a sartorial classic in this latter sense, and so in a more elevated sense is the classical repertoire of Western art music. The word "classic", long in literary and artistic use, was first applied to music after 1800, and here it does not imply "dead". When the term was applied to philosophical works is an under-explored issue, but it was also at some point in the 19th century. This is the sense in which the works of the Western philosophical canon from Plato to Wittgenstein are philosophical classics.

Only by drawing on an historicist and humanist view can one give a satisfactory account of the philosophical classics, I believe. A humanistic conception affirms a close relation between philosophy and its history – and between philosophy and history as such. A powerful humanistic case can be mounted that while the history of philosophy is itself part of philosophy, the history of science is history, not science. The other humanities – theology, law, politics and the arts – align themselves here with philosophy. Concern with its own history has been an overt feature of philosophy since the Renaissance, but is implicit in philosophical practice as far back as Plato and Aristotle, who tried to overcome their predecessors by describing and then rebutting them.

Philosophy is a living tradition. There are philosophical issues that one needs to keep re-thinking, and therefore reading the thinkers of the past gives us philosophical insight. The views of a canonical figure might be returned to and held again in some form. But the history of philosophy has a further value. Philosophy's concern with its own history helps to make the alien ideas of the past more familiar, helping us to grasp the hidden world-view of our own age – those assumptions too close to us to be easily visible. That world-view is defamiliarised, and so we can regard our own ideas as products of a moment in history. Our contemporary debates have their own historical dimension and context, about which one ought to be self-conscious – otherwise one will remain a victim of one's own historically-conditioned prejudices. Thus

philosophy's engagement with history goes far beyond concern with its own history. It counts for something that a position has been held by a leading member of the philosophical canon. However, the canon can also inspire an uncritical reverence before the Great Thinkers. One can hide behind Aristotle, or Kant, in a way that conceals problems with one's own position.

The contrast between the humanities and the sciences can be expressed by means of the concept of *vindictory explanation*. In such explanations, a later theory explains the one that it supplants, allowing proponents of the older theory to come to recognise this process as an advance. Vindictory explanation is commonplace in science, but despite the advocacy of Hegel and Marx, is much less apparent in philosophy. For instance, Einstein's theories explain the truth in Newton, but also develop and expand it. If this were the model in philosophy, the history of philosophy would indeed be a side-issue in the pursuit of philosophical truth. But it is not. Philosophical standpoints are generally abandoned because of changing intellectual fashion, tastes or commitments, rather than through refutation. With science, in contrast, refutation is more common; there is no philosophical equivalent of the refutation of phlogiston theory in the late 18th and early 19th century, and its replacement by an understanding of the process of oxidation.

Although its general standpoint is persuasive, I believe, an historicist and humanist account of philosophy may overstate the case. Philosophy – and indeed science – is both a human activity and an abstract space of theories, and those theories might be held to be progressive. For instance, Kant is held to have carried out a philosophical revolution, synthesising the truth in empiricism and rationalism. Among other advances, he rejected the theory of ideas in favour of a theory of judgment, established the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and presented the first modern understanding of self-consciousness as awareness of oneself as both subject and object. He showed how earlier thinkers went wrong, and so his philosophy could be said to offer

vindictory explanation. Some later philosophers did not grasp Kant's advances and remained essentially pre-Kantian, yet still made important contributions – notably Mill and his empiricist successors. Their pre-Kantian commitments are shown for instance in adherence to a theory of ideas – Russell's mature philosophy has been described as Hume plus modern logic.

Because of this dual nature – involving elements of vindictory and non-vindictory explanation – philosophical classics occupy an interesting situation. Some of them continue to present a live option, a position that in the context of one's time it is possible to hold. Others have ceased to do so. Although Descartes is still widely read, there are no genuine present-day Cartesians, though there may be dualists. The work of Kant is gradually taking on the same status, and so the sense in which there can be present-day Kantians is contentious; however, Aristotle's ethics seems more of a live option than the work of late 19th century British Idealists, or indeed than the attitudes to the problem of relations that so exercised Bertrand Russell and his contemporaries in the early 20th century. As a Wittgensteinian, however, I hope that the works of the Viennese master will endure as a live philosophical option for some time to come.

**Is there a significant moral distinction between active and passive euthanasia?**

J. T. SHARPE

The classic debate over active and passive euthanasia often stems from the Act/Omissions doctrine and rests on the distinction between killing and letting die. It is not my aim in this paper to make any moral judgement about either forms of euthanasia, it is merely to comment on the status of the moral distinction between the two. I shall begin by appealing to the intuitive notion that our omissions have causal powers. However, in the face of logical arguments and appeals to nature, I shall concede that there may well be a *causal* distinction between acts and omissions. However, it does not follow that this equates to a *moral* distinction between active and passive euthanasia. Furthermore, I shall argue that there is not, in fact, a moral distinction between the two. I shall conclude that due to a neglect of duty and intention, the traditional appeal to the Acts/Omissions doctrine as a justificatory tool for passive euthanasia as morally preferable to active euthanasia is unsound.

Before I begin it is important that I outline the basis of the usual argument for the moral distinction between active and passive euthanasia. This usually rests on the Act/Omissions doctrine which states that 'it makes an ethical difference whether an agent actively intervenes to bring about a result, or omits to act in circumstances in which it is foreseen that as a result of the omission the same result occurs' (Blackburn, 2005: 5). When applied to the medical practice of euthanasia, it is coupled with the distinction between killing and letting die. Active euthanasia is thus seen as the 'intentional termination of the life of one human being by another', whereas passive is often characterised as 'the cessation of the employment of extraordinary means<sup>2</sup> to prolong the life of the body when...death is imminent' (Rachels, 1975: 78).

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<sup>2</sup> There is, however, debate as to what should be classified as extraordinary means. However, I cannot go into it here. For a fuller discussion see (Oderberg, 2005). For the purposes of this paper, I shall simply take it for granted that the means to prolong life are 'extraordinary'.

My starting point then, is to appeal to the intuitive notion that our omissions do have causal powers. Is it not the case that when the doctor removes the life-sustaining treatment and the patient dies, that this 'cessation of extraordinary means' causes the death of the patient? If we take the principle that 'genuine causes must have at least some fully concrete effects' (Chappell, 2002: 219) then surely, since by definition the patient's death is 'imminent', in all cases of active and passive euthanasia (if performed correctly) the concrete effect is the death of the patient. Is it not the case then that omissions have causal powers?

However, as Chappell argues, this is not the case. Omissions cannot be real causes, since the results of real causes have to be additive. In other words, if I cause E1 and I cause E2, then I cause E1 *and* E2. However, the same cannot be said for omissions. Say I have the option of saving either Bill or Alan, but in doing so the other will certainly die, and if I refrain from acting both will die. If I refrain, I essentially 'omit to prevent Bill's death' and also 'omit to prevent Alan's death'. However, it does not follow that I 'omit to prevent Bill's death and Alan's death'. Therefore, omissions are not real causes.<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore, I believe that Chappell would attempt to counter my point by claiming the following: The idea that death is a concrete effect of the removal of life-sustaining treatment, despite the fact the patient's death would otherwise be imminent, is an illusion. Every time a doctor injects a patient with a lethal dose of morphine, it will kill the patient<sup>4</sup>; this effect *is* concrete. However, when a doctor removes an intravenous drip, it is not a logical necessity that the patient's death will proceed. A patient may well be able to carry on living without it. Granted, the fact the treatment is described as 'life-sustaining' means that without it the patient will die. However, this is purely contingent on the *natural* status of the patient (i.e. his health without the means of

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<sup>3</sup> Example taken from (Chappell, 2002: 217).

<sup>4</sup> Assuming that it is carried out competently.

treatment). The same treatment<sup>5</sup> would not necessarily result in the death of a healthier patient. Thus the effect of the omission is not concrete.

This is where proponents of the distinction often refer to *nature* (for example, cf. Brody, 1988 and Hopkins, 1997). Since, as has just been established, the death is purely contingent upon the *natural* status of the patient, it is claimed that the patient dies, 'not from medical actions, but from natural causes' (Hopkins, 1997: 32). Despite the fact that the doctor actively removes the life-sustaining process, it is not this that directly *causes* the death of the patient. It is ultimately the terminal disease that *causes* the death, not the doctor's action. This is why proponents of the distinction wish to remove the moral culpability from the doctor. He/she is not killing the patient, but merely *letting nature take its course*.

In light of such arguments, I am happy to concede that there may well be a *causal* distinction between acts (active euthanasia) and omissions (passive euthanasia). However, it does not follow that this necessarily equates to a *moral* distinction between the two. I will now attempt to show how, in the case of medical euthanasia, the distinction is *not* also a moral one.

Proponents of the distinction, however, do claim that this causal distinction necessarily equates to a moral one. For example, continuing the theme of natural death, it is claimed that the removal of life-sustaining treatment would not be violating their right not to be killed since it would 'simply mean letting the disease process take its natural course' (Brody, 1988: 168). Thus, since it is part of a 'noncausal relationship', the mere removal of life-sustaining treatment places the death of the patient into 'morally neutral territory' (Hopkins, 1997: 32). Consequently, there is an assumed moral distinction between active and passive euthanasia.

Such a view is mistaken. Simply because passive euthanasia is part of a noncausal relationship does not mean that it can be stripped of the immoral status which is assigned to active euthanasia. It is surely the case that we can hold agents *morally*

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<sup>5</sup> Granted, it would not be ascribed the descriptive term 'life-sustaining'.

responsible without saying that they are *causally* responsible (Chappell, 2002: 219).. Chappell makes a poignant distinction which I think holds a lot of ground in this discussion. He writes that it is surely the case that 'we are always morally responsible for our actions *unless there is a good reason why not*, and that we are never morally responsible for our omissions *unless there is a good reason why*' (*ibid.*). In the case of active and passive euthanasia, there is definitely *good reason* to say that we are morally responsible for our omissions.

Firstly, especially in the medical arena, there is a certain level of *duty to act* which must be taken into account. This is what Oderberg sees as the 'primary feature' of an omission which is on the same moral level as an act (in similar circumstances) (Oderberg, 2005: 219). There are certain relationships in which there is a duty to take care of those who we are responsible for (*ibid.*). Such a relationship is that between a doctor and a patient. This *duty to act* is often overlooked in the literature, especially by proponents of the distinction. For example, Philippa Foot argues that if there is no moral distinction between our acts and our omissions, then there is an issue concerning charity. In trying to show the absurdity of the distinction she claims that, if this were the case, there would be no moral difference between omitting to send money to Africa, knowing that without it, a number of people will die and sending out poisoned food to the same people (Foot, 1978). Foot overlooks the fact that we do not have the same responsibility of a *duty to act* as with a doctor to his/her patient. Thus, examples such as Foot's attempt to justify a moral distinction, but in doing so take the distinctions out of their fundamentally important contexts.

Furthermore, and most importantly, the reason why there should be no moral distinction is that in instances of both active and passive euthanasia, the sole intention is to *end the life* of the patient. At the beginning of this paper, I outlined the Act/Omissions doctrine. It stated that we are more morally culpable when actively interfering to bring about a result, than when we omit to act in circumstances where it is foreseen that the same result would occur. Nowhere in the definition of the Act/Omission doctrine is there any reference to the intention behind the omission. It is the intention which is the fundamental factor in determining the moral culpability of an

action or an omission. Returning to Foot's argument, her analogy breaks down since when we omit to send money to Africa we do not do so with the intention of harming, or killing these people (as one does by sending them poisoned food), but from other circumstantial reasons.

It is for this lack of consideration for duty, and more importantly the intention behind an action or an omission, that I do not think the traditional appeal to the Acts/Omissions doctrine as a justificatory tool for passive euthanasia as morally preferable to active euthanasia is sound. It may be true that there is a causal distinction between acting and omitting, but this has no reflection at all on the moral distinction when *both* instances stem from an intention to end the life of a human being. It is irrespective whether this is brought about by action or inaction (Sullivan, 1977: 45).

It has been my aim in this paper to attempt to collapse the proposed moral distinction between active and passive euthanasia. Starting with the intuitive notion that our omissions, especially in the case of euthanasia, have causal powers, I claimed that the removal of life-sustaining treatment must surely cause the death of the patient. However, faced with logical arguments to the contrary, and appeals to nature, I conceded that there may well be a causal distinction between our acts and our omissions. However, a causal distinction does not necessarily equate to a moral one. I argued that, despite the causal distinction, there is not a moral one. This is due to the fact that many of the proponents of the distinction are ignorant of both the *duty to act* in the doctor/patient relationship, and most importantly the *intention* behind the action or the omission. In pointing out that the formulation of the Act/Omissions doctrine completely ignores the idea of intention behind the moral justification of an omission, I concluded that to use it as a justificatory tool for making passive euthanasia morally preferable to active euthanasia is unsound.



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**On Cosmopolitan Justice**

JUSTIN CASH

I will open with just a couple of statistical observations that will later reinforce my position. The average per capita income of high income countries is some 180 times higher than that of poor countries, whilst approximately 1.3% of global product is consumed by the 44% of the world's population that lives below the international poverty line. The annual death toll from poverty-related causes currently stands at around 18 million, accounting for one third of all human deaths, and despite this, citizens of affluent countries tend to view it as a situation that occasions minor charitable assistance only (Pogge, 2002). These are just some of the facts of the matter when dealing with the lamentable, unjustifiable and morally reprehensible state of global inequality. The purpose of this article is to illustrate that this is the case through greater argument, and to propose a form of cosmopolitanism that lies somewhere between the strong and weak conceptions of it.

Scant justification is needed to show that the worst off suffer in both absolute and relative terms. According to Pogge, these inequalities are impervious, i.e. it is difficult or impossible for the worst off to improve their lot by themselves, and the best off never experience life at the bottom. Moreover, inequalities pervade not merely some, but all aspects of life. No obviously controversial claims have been made as yet. Pogge is more controversial, however, in his claim that the extremes of poverty are avoidable- the wealthy can improve the circumstances of the impoverished without becoming badly off themselves. This seems a plausible assertion, though once again made on statistical evidence that the global poor would only have to consume 1% more of global product to escape poverty as defined by the international poverty line (Pogge, 2002). This situation for Pogge is a violation both of our negative duties not to harm, and our positive duties to avoid past actions causing harm in the future (though it is the negative duties that apparently carry most weight).

The view that Pogge (and the author) extracts from these above considerations is an 'intermediate' form of cosmopolitanism. Broadly speaking, weak cosmopolitanism is the anodyne view that all human beings are of equal worth, whereas strong cosmopolitanism is the view that all human agents ought to treat all others equally and, in particular, have no more or less, reason to help any particular needy person over any other (Pogge 2003). Weak cosmopolitanism is indistinctive in that everyone, bar a few racists and bigots, would accept it. Strong cosmopolitanism fails pragmatically by curtailing associative duties to those we have intimate relationships with.

Hence, it is an improvement, without compromising the key moral stance of cosmopolitanism, to suggest instead that compatriotism simply makes no difference to our most important negative duties, and among these is the duty not to impose an unjust institutional order upon other humans. What Pogge is saying is that our duty not to impose an unjust social order on foreigners is exactly the same as our obligation not to subject our compatriots to an unjust institutional schema. This is more compatible with associative duties, insofar as these increase what we owe to some without diminishing what we owe to humanity at large in this case. If one wants a perspective on the extent of the institutional harms that we currently inflict, to reinforce the need for a practical implication of this principle, see Joseph Stiglitz's excellent '*Globalisation and its Discontents*' (Stiglitz, 2003).

This adaptation of standard cosmopolitan codes allows us to keep all the benefits of them. As Nagel observes, it seems highly arbitrary that the average individual born into poverty should have radically lower life prospects than one born into riches (Nagel, 1986: 171). After all, state borders appear to be random legal boundaries, and this is an important part of cosmopolitan thinking (Caney, 2005). One does not have to appeal to ethereal notions of natural rights, or purely emotive arguments concerning suffering (for instance) that can lack rigour to argue that geography should not limit our principles of justice. Nor does any form of cosmopolitanism necessarily entail strict global egalitarianism in terms of resources.

Yet some maintain we do have reason enough to restrict principles of distributive justice. It is said that human beings must have stronger attachments toward members of their own state or nation, and that attempts to disperse attachments to fellow-citizens in order to honour a moral community with human beings as such will only serve to cripple our sensibilities (Kleingeld and Brown, 2011). Political and social engagement would decline if so, and needy compatriots would descend in to some form of permanent animosity at a situation which gives no priority in aid to them. In essence, it is claimed that the loss of social trust in a perfectly cosmopolitan system would be excessive. Scheffler, however, is adamant that any duty based on personal relations that the anti-cosmopolitan would produce ignores the same duty that others have in other countries (Kleingeld and Brown, 2011). For example, to say that “I have a duty to provide for my children” also means that “person X in country Y has a duty to provide for their children”. This is neglected if we are not guided outwards, away from obvious local obligations, or allow them to crowd out obligations to distant others. Morality need not discount special obligations to oneself or to one’s children, family, friends or partner. But if one claims that in their special relationship to their children there exist moral obligations to them that don’t exist towards other children, they also must recognise that other parents’ relationships with their children ground identical person-specific obligations on their part (Audi 2006).

Reviewing all of these though, a noteworthy hypocrisy arises for those who abhor the gulf between rich and poor in the developed world, but who will not protest at the grievous injustice that is global divergence in wealth. A healthy dose of the moral stance that is cosmopolitanism in the proposed mould could go a long way to realise both the political and economic gains of increased worldwide interdependence. The greatest criticism I can give is of the deliberate ignorance that alleviating poverty is beyond our power or would significantly worsen our lot, regardless of the existence of moral claims to duty and obligation that I have focused on. To think of it as generosity, or to deflect fault for the current situation, is, frankly, selfishness that

ignores the equivalent moral worth of all individuals that represents only the very weakest form of cosmopolitanism that the vast majority are prepared to agree on.

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
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