The Global Plastics Treaty: A Case for a Modest Beginning

1. The Global Plastics Treaty: The Case for a Modest Beginning

Plastic pollution is difficult to regulate because plastics remain indispensable to everyday life and to the global economy even as their environmental toll mounts. Although States broadly agree that the problem demands a coordinated international response, yet they remain divided over what a global treaty should cover, how quickly action should be taken, and what form its obligations should assume. This piece examines why a global plastics treaty is needed, why the negotiations have stalled, what outcome is now likely, and why even a relatively modest framework agreement would be worth having.

2. Why a Global Plastics Treaty?

A growing body of scientific evidence shows that environmental and human health harms arise throughout the plastics value chain. In response, UNEP has increasingly promoted a “life-cycle approach” encompassing raw material extraction and polymer production (upstream), product design and use (midstream), and waste management and disposal (downstream).

Existing international law reaches that life cycle only through a patchwork of instruments. Major agreements, including UNCLOS, the CBD and the climate treaties, address plastic pollution only indirectly through broader concerns such as marine pollution, biodiversity loss and environmental degradation. Instruments that regulate plastics more directly generally focus on particular activities or substances. For example, MARPOL Annex V,  addresses ship-generated waste, while the Basel Convention and its Plastic Waste Amendments regulate the transboundary movement of plastic waste. The Rotterdam, Stockholm and Minamata Conventions apply only to certain hazardous chemicals associated with plastics, not to plastics as such.

A 2017 assessment report prepared for the third session of the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA) identified significant gaps in the existing governance framework and strengthened calls for a dedicated agreement. In March 2022, 175 States adopted Resolution 5/14, which established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, based on a comprehensive approach addressing the full life cycle of plastic. The Committee was expected to complete its work by the end of 2024.

3. Why Did the Negotiations Stall?

The negotiations did not conclude by the end of 2024. Six rounds of substantive negotiations have so far failed to produce an agreed treaty text. A further one-day session in February 2026 was administrative in nature and resulted only in the election of a new Chair. The stalemate reflects both deep disagreement over what the treaty should regulate and a negotiating process that has struggled to manage those differences within a compressed timetable.

At the heart of the disagreement is what the full life cycle of plastic should include. Resolution 5/14 adopted this language without incorporating UNEP’s tripartite understanding of upstream, midstream, and downstream activities. States have therefore interpreted the mandate differently, often in ways that reflect their economic interests and regulatory preferences.

The High Ambition Coalition (HAC), a negotiating bloc of more than 75 States, includes EU Member States, several African and Latin American States, and many Small Island Developing States. As many of its members are not major fossil-fuel or petrochemical producers, the HAC is generally less economically exposed to production restrictions and therefore supports a comprehensive treaty that includes controls on upstream production and hazardous chemicals used in plastics. By contrast, the Like-Minded Group (LMG), which includes major fossil fuel and plastic producing States such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia, favours an approach centred on downstream measures. For these States, restrictions on plastic production may affect important sources of national revenue and economic development. Further, the disagreement over the treaty’s scope has shaped other key areas of the negotiations, including decision-making procedures, the content and legal character of obligations, implementation arrangements, and financing.

Resolving disagreements of this breadth within the two-year timetable set by Resolution 5/14 proved difficult. As the negotiating text expanded, efforts to keep the process on schedule led to increasingly crowded meeting schedules, with several contact groups often convening in parallel. This placed smaller delegations at a disadvantage, as they were often unable to participate effectively in discussions taking place at the same time. Some important discussions were also closed to observers, limiting public scrutiny and excluding voices capable of counterbalancing industry representation.

Time pressure also increased reliance on negotiating texts prepared by the Chair and the secretariat. Because some of these texts were not produced under specific mandates from the INC, several delegations questioned their procedural legitimacy and representativeness.

These procedural problems did not cause the substantive divisions between States. They nevertheless made those divisions harder to manage. The compressed timetable limited sustained discussion, unequal participation weakened confidence in the fairness of the negotiations, and disagreement over the status of the negotiating texts eroded trust in the process. The negotiating process therefore increasingly reinforced, rather than helped to resolve, the stalemate.

4. What Is the Likely Outcome?

The election of a new INC Chair may help restore confidence in the negotiating process and address some procedural difficulties. It is unlikely, however, to resolve the deeper political disagreements between delegations. Some States and scholars have therefore suggested moving negotiations outside the UN process in the hope of producing a faster and more ambitious treaty. Yet an agreement negotiated by a smaller group will have limited effectiveness if it excludes major plastic and fossil fuel-producing States.

In my view, as long as most delegations remain committed to the INC process, the immediate priority should be to identify sufficient common ground to conclude an agreement, rather than attempting to resolve every contested issue at once. Interestingly, the most recent Chair’s draft texts already point in this direction. They place considerable weight on procedural obligations, while many substantive provisions are qualified by formulations such as “as appropriate”, “is encouraged to”, and “taking into account national circumstances and capabilities”. Further details on implementation are left to future COP decisions and annexes. Politically sensitive issues, such as the treaty’s mandate and its relationship with other environmental and trade agreements, are largely confined to the preamble rather than resolved in operative provisions.

Taken together, these features suggest that the eventual agreement is likely to be framed like a framework agreement. For many HAC members, this would understandably look like a bad deal. Their concern is that the agreement may remain weak because the same political opposition blocking stronger obligations now could prevent it from being strengthened later. This helps explain why these draft texts have not been accepted as the negotiating basis for the next session.

That said, whatever form the agreement ultimately takes, it is likely to fall short of the ambition envisaged in Resolution 5/14 and disappoint those seeking immediate action.

5. Is a Framework Agreement Still Worth It?

My answer is yes.

A modest deal is better than no deal at all. It could create the institutions needed for future cooperation, including reporting and review procedures, scientific bodies and regular meetings of the Parties. These mechanisms would not guarantee that the treaty becomes stronger, but without them there would be no global structure through which stronger rules could later be developed.

Political positions may also change. States that favour stronger action can continue to regulate plastic production and harmful additives domestically, building practices that may later influence other countries and the development of the treaty regime. Civil society actors can continue to raise public awareness, scrutinise implementation and even bring plastics-related litigation, generating political pressure from the ground up. Over time, these forms of pressure may influence what States are prepared to accept internationally.

Major breakthroughs in international environmental governance rarely arrive fully formed. The Montreal Protocol and the Paris Agreement were both strengthened through sustained political pressure, institutional development and evolving State practice. The plastics treaty is unlikely to be different and should be measured not by whether the first agreement reaches the summit, but whether it creates a path for achieving the ultimate objective.

6. Concluding Thoughts

The negotiation process for a plastics treaty has undoubtedly been frustrating. Scientific evidence has consistently pointed to the need for urgent action, yet political progress has remained slow. This is not unique to the plastics treaty. Contemporary environmental agreements are increasingly complex, while divergent economic interests, uneven capacities and competing development priorities make consensus difficult to achieve and negotiations longer to conclude. Recent climate change advisory opinions may make negotiators more cautious still by showing how broadly framed obligations can acquire more stringent legal content through later interpretation.

The slow pace of the negotiations should not, however, be mistaken for evidence that the INC process has reached a dead end. The immediate priority should be to secure a treaty that establishes institutions and mechanisms through which the regime can evolve over time. Even a modest beginning may be enough to change the trajectory of global plastics governance.

References

1. UNEP/EA.3/13, Progress in the implementation of resolution 2/11 on marine plastic litter and microplastics: report of the Executive Director (2017).
2. United Nations, Nations Sign Up to End Global Scourge of Plastic Pollution (2 March 2022).
3. UNEA Resolution 5/14, End Plastic Pollution: Towards an International Legally Binding Instrument (2022).
4. UNEP, Life Cycle Initiative (n.d.).
5. Tobias D Nielsen et al., ‘Politics and the Plastic Crisis: A Review throughout the Plastic Life Cycle’ (2020) 9(1) WIREs Energy and Environment e360.
6. OECD, Global Plastics Outlook: Policy Scenarios to 2060 (OECD Publishing, 2022).
7. High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution, Official Website (n.d.).
8. Iran, Statement on Behalf of the Like-Minded Group (INC-3 Preparatory Meeting, 11 November 2023).
9. Daniel Bodansky, ‘The UNEP Plastics Negotiations: Is There a Will and a Way?’ EJIL: Talk! (8 October 2025).
10. Felix Wertli, ‘Why We Couldn’t Agree on a Plastics Treaty in Geneva – and What Might Happen Next’ Climate Home News (21 August 2025).
11. IISD, Summary Report of the Second Part of the Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to Develop an International Legally Binding Instrument on Plastic Pollution, Including in the Marine Environment (INC-5.2) (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 18 August 2025).
12. Paul Einhäupl et al., ‘The Global Plastics Treaty Can Be Saved—Here’s How to Break the Deadlock’ (2026) 650 Nature.
13. INC Chair, Draft and Revised Text Proposals (13 and 15 August 2025).