30 October 2025 - 30 October 2025
1:00PM - 3:00PM
Mill Hill Lane
Free
The Centre for Environmental and Energy Economics (CE3) is happy to invite you to this seminar on Thursday 30th of October at Mill Hill Lane. Our guest speaker will present their work from 1pm to 2pm, and then there will be tea and coffee from 2pm to 3pm.
Abstract:
Mean-field game models involve the distribution of states or controls across the agent population, which in linear-quadratic settings typically reduces to the inclusion of the mean value of the distribution. We address a class of quantilized models, which rather include quantiles of the state distribution. This class of models is a generalization of the classical linear-quadratic setting, where the quantile level is set to 0.5.
Ranking quantilized games model a competition between homogeneous agents, set by a coordinator who aims to select a certain proportion of top ranking agents at the end of the time horizon. The proportion is predetermined and announced by the coordinator before the competition begins, and the performance of the agents is evaluated at the terminal time. The threshold for success is determined based on the collective performance of agents.
We propose an application to early-stage venture investments, where a venture capital firm sets a threshold for success, which depends on the performance of a large pool of startup companies competing for funding over a finite horizon. We provide two formulations for this competition (target-based and threshold-based, where the target-based formulation can be solved analytically. Through numerical experiments, we show that this analytical solution provides a very good approximation for the threshold-based formulation.
About the speaker:
Michèle Breton is a Professor in the Department of Decision Sciences at HEC Montréal in Québec, Canada.
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